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We explore public good experiments in which players have the opportunity to form 
cooperative coalitions. The decision to join a coalition is voluntary as is a member’s 
decision to comply with the terms of the coalition. An informal enforcement mechanism 
is examined in which coalition members and nonmembers can impose costly 
punishments on one another. We find that when punishments are purely voluntary, 
coalition members and freeriding nonmembers are equally likely to punish noncompliant 
coalition members. Moreover, the extent to which nonmembers punish noncompliance 
does not change regardless of whether the members can credibly enforce compliance 













Promoting participation and maintaining compliance with coalitions that are formed 
voluntarily is an issue of great concern, perhaps most importantly in its application to 
international treaties (e.g. Kyoto Protocol). The coalition structure we investigate in this 
study follows from a set of games developed for the analysis of cartels and international 
environmental agreements (e.g. Barrett, 1994; Kosfeld et al., 2009). In this study we use 
experiments to investigate the extent of voluntary punishment – coalition members and 
nonmembers having the opportunity to inflict costly punishment in response to detected 
cases of noncompliance and/or nonparticipation – and its effect on the level of 
participation and compliance with these coalitions. We compare a strictly voluntary 
punishment situation with one in which coalition members can credibly commit ex ante 
to punishing noncompliant members. We find that coalition members and free-riding 
nonmembers are equally likely to punish noncompliance. Moreover, the extent to which 
nonmembers punish noncompliance does not change regardless of whether the 
members can credibly enforce compliance within their coalition. 
 
The voluntary punishment mechanism in our experiments is a type of informal sanction 
closely related to the institutions originally analysed by Fehr and Gachter (2000) and 
further investigated in a multitude of more recent studies (e.g. Fehr and Gachter, 2002; 
Masclet et al., 2003; Casari, 2005; Page et al., 2005; Anderson and Putterman, 2006; 
Bochet et al., 2006; Sefton et al., 2007; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008). The existing 
body of research shows that subjects, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, do 
impose costly punishments on other group members and the existence of punishment 
opportunities can help foster cooperation. While others have explored punishments 
within groups and across groups in public good games (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; 
Carpenter and Matthews, 2009), they have not explored these issues in the context of 
endogenous group formation. Our experiments contribute to this body of work by 
analysing informal punishment within and outside of coalitions that are endogenously 




Three treatments are implemented, each with 20 subjects forming 4-person groups 
which are randomly reshuffled for 12 periods (i.e. strangers’ design).1 In the first stage 
of each treatment (coalition stage) subjects make a discrete choice whether to join a 
coalition in which its members agree to contribute their endowment to a public good 
provided that at least two players join. If less than two players join, then a coalition does 
not form and each player keeps their endowment. 2 If a coalition forms, the members, in 
stage two (compliance stage), choose whether to comply with the terms of the coalition 
and contribute their endowment to the public good. Nonmembers automatically choose 
not to contribute their endowment. The underlying game is an n-player prisoners’ 
dilemma in which the private value of the endowment is $7 while the public benefit of 
contributing the endowment is $3 (joint pay-offs are maximized when all four players 
join the coalition and contribute their endowment to the public good). The baseline 
treatment, called no punishment, consists of only these two stages and in a Subgame-
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) zero contributions to the public good are made in 
stage two. In stage one, any level of participation is part of a Nash equilibrium. 
 
In the voluntary punishment treatment, a third stage (punishment stage) is added in 
which each of the four players in a group (coalition members and nonmembers) can 
make mutually beneficial bilateral trades. In this stage they make a discrete choice 
whether to trade with each of the other three group members. If either or both trading 
partners choose not to trade, then both players receive $0. Otherwise they both receive 
$4. When making trading decisions, players are provided with complete information 
regarding the other players’ decisions from the coalition and compliance stages. Thus, 
not trading with another group member is a form of costly punishment.4 The SPNE in 
this game is defined by all players trading with one another in stage three, zero 
contributions made to the public good in stage two and any number of players joining 
the coalition in stage one. In our third treatment, quasi-voluntary punishment, the only 
deviation compared to the voluntary punishment treatment is that coalition members 
commit to punishing (not trading with) noncompliant coalition members. The punishment 
for noncompliance is more than sufficient to motivate full compliance by risk-neutral 
coalition members. The SPNE in this game has all players trading with one another in 
stage three, full compliance by the coalition members in stage two and two players 




The following results are based on the average provision of the public good displayed in 
Fig. 1, the summary statistics on punishment contained in Table 1 and regression 
output contained in Table 2.6 From Table 2, the number of members was statistically 
equivalent between the no punishment and voluntary punishment treatments 
, but decreased with quasivoluntary punishment 
. From Fig. 1 and the regression results in Table 2, as 
predicted, the average provision of the public good did not change between the no 
punishment and the voluntary punishment treatments  but 
increased significantly in the quasi-voluntary punishment treatment . 
The trend lines in Fig. 1 exhibit typical decreasing contributions to public goods found in 
many public good experiments (Ledyard, 1995). 
 
 








Table 2. Regression results on coalition participation, public good provision, 
punishing noncompliance and punishing nonparticipation 
Although punishment in response to cases of noncompliance was used sparingly (34 
out of 384 cases), surprisingly, we find that a larger percentage of freeriding 
nonmembers punished noncompliance within coalitions compared with the percentage 
of coalition members that punished noncompliance. Table 1 summarizes the extent of 
punishment in response to noncompliance (and nonparticipation) between coalition 
members and nonmembers. With voluntary punishment, in 12.12% of cases in which 
nonmembers traded with noncompliant members, nonmembers imposed a sanction. 
That is, free-riding nonmembers were willing to impose costly punishments on 
noncompliant coalition members. On the other hand, in 8.81% of cases in which 
members traded with noncompliant members, the members imposed sanctions. When 
controlling for period and subject effects (Table 2), however, these differences are not 
statistically significant . When breaking down the 8.81% further, 
noncompliant coalition members rarely punished other noncompliant coalition members 
(1.46%) while compliant coalition members punished noncompliance in 22.32% of 
cases. 
 
Interestingly, when coalition members were committed to punishing noncompliant 
members (i.e. quasi-voluntary punishment) the extent to which nonmembers punished 
noncompliant members did not change (at a = 0.05) compared to voluntary punishment 
. Therefore, despite that noncompliant coalition members were 
certain to be punished by all of the other coalition members in quasi-voluntary 
punishment, the likelihood of a nonmember punishing a coalition member in response to 
noncompliance did not change. 
 
Finally, while nonmembers almost never punished nonparticipation (1 out of 40 cases, 
2.5%), over both treatments coalition members imposed punishments on nonmembers 
in 37 out of 221 cases (16.74%). The likelihood of a coalition member punishing 





Although punishments were used sparingly, members and nonmembers were equally 
likely to punish noncompliance within voluntary coalitions that provide a public good, 
and the extent of nonmember punishment does not change regardless of whether the 
members can credibly enforce compliance within their coalition. We also find that the 
threat of purely voluntary punishment is not effective at increasing contributions to the 
public good, but contributions increase significantly when members can commit ex ante 
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